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Sharing capacity can lead to significant logistics improvements. Sharing the information
needed to determine if capacity can be shared poses problems. "Ve present a method that
addresses both issues, specifically finding opportunities to swap loads without revealing any
information except the loads swapped. The paper includes proofs of the security of this
method, as well as an analysis of the cost reduction based on real-world transportation
data.
1. Introduction
In a competitive market for operational capacity, there are numerous instances where indi-
vidual companies would like to swap tasks or loads to gain operational efficiencies. Trucking
companies face the problem of inefficiencies deriving from contracts that require them to
deliver to all locations required by a shipper. Paper companies facing the need to do special
setups or required to deliver to out-of-the-way locations would prefer to trade loads to im-
prove the efficiency of production and delivery of rolls of paper. Steel companies face similar
problems of dealing with surplus inventories with specific properties (Kalagnanam, Trumbo
& Lee 2000). In such markets, the broker plays the role of market maker by collecting and
distributing loads. Often, barter companies act as independent brokers to facilitate these
transactions across competitors.
One reason for use of such a broker is that it prevents disclosure of proprietary informa-
tion to competitors. However, this information must still be revealed to the broker. The
cryptographic community has shown that a trusted third party is not required - it is possible
to compute functions without either disclosing private data to any other party(Yao 1986, Gol-
dreich, Micali & vVigderson 1987). The result is that no party learns more than they would
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if a broker arranged the transactions, and no broker is required. Our goal is to apply state of
the art techniques from data encryption to logistic," problems to automate the task performed
by the broker. Companies learn no more than with an honest broker. However, the broker
is eliminated. In fact, for the specific problem and solution given in this paper, we prove
that no party learns more than the minimum they must know to accomplish the desired
efficiency gains. The benefit to shipping companies and shippers is the ability to reduce the
costs associated with collaborating and thus improve the efficiency of the overall system.
In order to provide a complete treatment of our approach, we examine a specific prob-
lem context involving truck routing. Truck transport is a $481 billion industry in the US.
However, the industry is extremely fragmented with the largest company accounting for less
than 5% of the market. The main source of inefficiency in this industry is the "deadhead"
miles or miles driven empty. The primary reason for this inefficiency is the spatial nature of
this industry i.e., for a truck to pickup a load, it physically has to be at that location. When
the tmck is done, it ends up at the physical drop off point and then has to travel to the
required location to be useful. Intuitively, if transport companies swap some of their loads,
there is the potential for Pareto improving savings (i.e., neither company faces a higher cost
and at least one company faces a lower cost).
However, attempts to collaborate and thus swap loads to get more efficient routes are
often discouraged by the potential desire by individual companies to "share only if beneficial" .
In addition, legal restrictions, dealing with anti-trust issues, frown upon information sharing
and collaboration that can be potentially anti-competitive. However anti-trust issues do
permit competing firms to engage in limited information sharing and collaboration that
is clearly efficiency enhancing. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, "It is permissible
(for shipping companies) to cooperate in certain ways. For instance, if two of them carry
chemicals for a given producer on the same route, they may pool their capacity for the
purpose of operational efficiency.... But cooperating to divide up markets or affect prices
would fall outside these permitted arrangements" (Bandler 2003).
If transport companies resort to using a broker to swap loads, then the first step is for
each company to independently identify loads it would like to swap. These potential loads
are provided to a broker who now sees all available loads. As a result, parties will only make
things available that they view as likely to be picked up in a swap. Thc key diffcrence in OUT
approach is that all available loads are provided by all companies. The algorithm is cxccuted
in a distributed manner by each company and at no time is the data cntrustcd to any third
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party. In addition, the secure protocols used in the algorithm guarantee that no information
other than the swapped loads that improve efficiency are revealed to each company, and all
such efficiency-improving swaps are made. This results in both lower information disclosure
and higher efficiency than a traditional broker intermediated model.
Why would companies want such an approach? One motivation comes from the trans-
port companies themselves as part of their desire to protect proprietary information while
achieving maximum efficiency. However, another motivation may come from shippers who
could demand SUcll a protocol be used by their associated carriers to ensure that efficiency
is enhanced while preventing any collusion regarding data that is not explicitly required to
be shared and that may reduce competitiveness of the carrier market.
Thus, in this paper, we do the following:
1. \Ve provide an algorithm that ensures that sharing takes place only if eaeh company
sees its costs reduced and that the sharing scheme ensures that all potential players
can engage to identify cost reducing swaps, while
'. ensuring no information is shared other than what can be concluded from the
final swapped points, and
• honesty on the part of the collaborators is ensured by guaranteeing that either
it can be detected that one participant is cheating (and thus gets thrown out of
future collaborations) or that the cheating is not incentive compatible, i.e., the
cheater is worse off.
2. \Ve apply the algorithm proposed to an empirical dataset from a transportation com-
pany that provided us with 12 weeks of pickup and delivery data. This empirical data
suggests the delivered value of the algorithm. Empirical results suggest the potential
to reduce costs by over 30% based on application of the algorithm.
3. We show that the algorithm, implemented in a decentralized manner, affords the global
optimum split of loads for a specific setting. Empirical results show its role in practice
when pickups and deliveries are considered.
While the algorithm proposed is a heuristic in the context of vehicle routing, it uses the state
of the art techniques in data encryption and secure multi-party computation techniques that
guarantee that the security requirements are met. It thus brings up an interesting issue for
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algorithm design for managing information sharing i.e., how does one choose the tradeoff
between an optimal algorithm for routing that might provide information leakage against a
heuristic algorithm that prevents leakage but is a heuristic in the problem domain.
One goal with this paper is to suggest the application of cryptographic techniques as
a enabler of operational efficiency as a potentially fruitful area of research in operations
management. To further this goal, we also included summaries of the literature in data
security and several illustrative examples for the proposed algorithm.
1.1 Problem Description
Given N independent transport companies, each with m points located in two dimensions
that have to be served by a truck, identify a sequence of enquiries and swaps between pairs
of companies that results in:
1. a set of points that when swapped between the companies guarantees that no company
is worse off,
2. no information is shared other than what can be concluded from the final swapped
points,
3. the algorithm is polynomial in running time, and
4. any cheating by either party during the execution of the algorithm can either be de-
tected by the other party, or results in a less efficient solution for the cheating party,
thus providing the incentive to truthfully follow the algorithm.
We first map the initial two dimensional problem to one dimension using a space fill-
ing curve. The basic idea of lIsing a space filling curve to develop heuristic.."i for combi-
natorial problems is de.'lcribed in Bartholdi III & Platzman (1988). Since there is a one
to one mapping from two dimensions to one dimension, points identified for swap in one
dimension provide a unique pointer to the corresponding original point location in two
dimensions. Bartholdi and Platzman show that the heuristic has (a) 25% worse than
optimal worst case performance for planar traveling salesman problems (Bartholdi III &
Platzman 1982) and (b) generates solutions within one second that has a gap of less than
34% more than the best approach for large problems using 2 months of computing time (see
http://www.isye.gatech.edu/-jjb/mow/mow.html) and (c) is used in many implemented lo-
gistics packages such as the ARC/Info Geographical Information System, the CAPS Logistics
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Toolkit of Baan Systems, and other commercial systems managing 2-dimensional data (sec
http://www.isye.gatech.edu/-jjb/mow/mow.html ). Note that our approach will be to in-
corporate the encryption processes within this heuristic.
Why map to one dimension? In general this is an NP-hard optimization problem, even
without worrying about privacy/security. While proper choice of heuristics may give good
solutions directly on the two dimensional problem, choosing those heuristics requires an
understanding of the characteristics of the data - and sharing this information violates goal
2. However, in one dimension the optimal solution is tractable: search for the best solution
requires a logarithmic number of steps. We will show that such search can be done in a
way that reveals no information not obviolls from the remIts (loads swapped), using secure
comparison and oblivious transfer as cryptographic primitives.
The basic idea of the algorithm is that the parties use a space-filling curve to map this
to a one-dimensional problem. In one dimension, the parties perform a binary search for the
maximum number of points to swap such that each party benefits, i.e., all points received
are closer than points given. vVe give a simple example based on .6.'s point of view. Refer to
Figure 1, and assume .6. wants all of its points to be located on the right. Figures l(a)-l(c)
reflect .6. 's independent view: Its initial route, a space-filling curve mapping the points to
one dimension, and the one-dimensional view of its initial points. Figure l(d) is its view at
the completion of the algorithm: It has given up its three most distant points, and received
three that are closer. vVe will now describe the "magic" that allows .6. to determine which
points it gives and receives, without learning (or revealing) anything else.
1.2 Solution Overview
In one dimension, the problem of determining which points to swap reduces to determining
how many to swap. Each party is given one end of the line; the goal is to determine how
many points to swap to partition the line.
To demonstrate this, we "open up" the view in Figure 2, so the reader (but not .6.) can
see both sides. The idea of the algorithm is to check and see if it is okay to swap a certain
number of points, without either side learning anything except if that many points will be
a beneficial swap. This check is done securely, so that the parties learn only if swapping
a certain number of points is beneficial, not where the points are. vVe describe this using
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Figure 1: A feasible approach from b. 's point of view
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Figure 2: Illustration of OSROD Execution
1=1
IIbollnd'=OO
Figure 3: Example of execution
correspond to positions on a line, a box entry has a < if 0 will benefit from swapping the
given number of points if everyone it receives is at or to the left of that point.
Figure 3 shows the values of the bOXe."l for checking if swapping a single point is okay. If
o receives points to the left of 15, it benefits (since it gives up a point at 15.) However, if
it were to receive a point at 15 or 16, it would be better not to swap.
If it were to swap one point, I:::::. would give up its point at position 1. It therefore opens
the box at position 1 (its leftmost point) - since this is >, 0 (and 1:::::.) will gain from swapping
one point.
The key to the security of the process is that 0 doesn't know which box 6. opened, and
6. only learns the value in one box. (This is accomplished through a cryptographic protocol
described on page 8.) Thus the only thing learned from the protocol is the value ">". Since
the final result (Figure I(d)) shows 6. involves swapping three points, both parties could
figure out at the end that swapping one point is okay. While they have learned something
new at this point, since it will be obvious once the final swap occurs, it doesn't really reveal
anything.
This process is repeated to find the right number of points to swap. Figure 4 shows the
test for i = 2; 6. looks at position 3 and finds it is okay to swap two points. Figure 5 shows
i = 4; looking at position 9 6. finds that four points given by 0 would include at least one
to the left of this point, so it isn't a beneficial swap. All that is now left is testing a swap
1=2
IIbl)lInd'=oo
Figure 4: Example of execution
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1= 4
Ibound .. 2, ubound=OO
Figure 5: Example of execution
1= 3
Figure 6: Example of execution
of 3 points - this is shown in Figure G. Since this is okay «), and four points doesn't work,
the final result is to swap three points.
As we will proven later, nothing is learned from this protocol that 0 and 6. wouldn't
learn from giving all of their data to an honest broker. This is accomplished without the
need for an honest broker. For example I from what 6. sees during the execution of the
protocol (the shaded boxes only) I 6 knows that 0 has fewer than four points to the right of
position 9 1 and at least three to the right of position" four. But these would be obvious even
with an honest broker: 6. learns of the as at 11, 13, and 15 from the swap, and knows that
there cannot be another a to the right of 9 or it would have been swapped as well. Thus the
algorithm ensures that sharing of beneficial information is identified by circle and triangle
with no other information being revealed in the process.
We still need to make sure that only one of the electronic "boxes" is opened by 6 1 and
that 0 doesn't learn which box is opened. vVe now show how to do this, even if one parly
tries to cheat. The cryptography community refers to this problem as lout of N oblivious
transfer; it has been the subject of extensive research. Here, we will describe a simple 1
out of N oblivious transfer (OT[) protocol from Naor & Pinkas (2001) and Naor & Pinkas
(1999).
First, we describe two cryptographic definitions that are used in the protocol.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption: Assume that p is a very large prime num-
ber and 9 is the generator of its multiplicative group (i.e. every number between
1 ... p - 1 can be written as 91.: mod p fol' some k between 1 ...p - 1). The computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman Assumption states that given ga mod p and gb mod p (Note that
a and b is not given), there is no efficient way to compute gnb mod p. This assumption
is the basis for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; if it docs not hold many
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cryptographic techniques would be breakable.
Random Oracle Assumption: In the construction of the protocol, we will use a crypto-
graphic Hash function H. vVe assume that this function is known to aU parties (e.g.,
SHA) and it maps its input to what appears to be a random output. Again, this is a
common cryptographic tool llsed in many protocols.
Now using the Diffie-Hellman Assumption and a hash function H, we can implement a lout
of n oblivious transfer that discloses no information even if one of the parties tries to deviate
from the protocoL
For simplicity, we will describe lout of 2 oblivious transfer (OTn first, then show a
method to extend any OTI2 protocol to arbitrary aTr using log(n) aT? operations. In the
following protocol, let fJ be the index of the box that b,. wants to open. (Note that in aT?,
we have only two boxes), and that Bo and B I are the contents of boxes 0 and 1 respectively.
Also note that every operation except evaluating the function Hand ffi (exclusive or) is done
mod p.-
1. 0 publishes a random number G between 1, ... ,p - 1 along with 9 and p.
2. /;i picks a random number k between 1, ... ,p - 1, sets Pu = gk and H-u = G/ Pu, and
sends Po to O.
3, 0 finds P, by evaluating CIPo, creates Eo ~ (g", H((Po)'")ffiBo), E, = (g", H((P1)")ffi
B I ), by randomly choosing TO, rl between 1, ... ,p - 1, and sends Eo, E r to 6.
4, 6 computes H((P.)'") = H((g'")k)) to find B.,
In the above protocol the choice of 6 (fJ) is not revealed because all 0 receives is either g~.
or CJgk, where k is chosen randomly. Since operations are done in mod p, both gk or GJgk
values are uniformly distributed between 0, ... ,p - 1. Therefore, 0 does not see anything
more than a random number. 6 learns nothing by receiving the random C, or (because
of the random oracle hash function) from inspecting Eo or E1 . vVhile 6 can decrypt Eu
to obtain the final result, by the original Diffie-Hellman assumption it cannot determine
(gr"'_I)k to decrypt the other box. If bigtriangleup could decrypt both Eo and E1, it means
that it knows a efficient way to find t such that C = 91 mod p for given randomly chosen
C. This would contradict with the Diffie-Hellman assumption, because given gQ mod p and
g'J mod p, 6 can calculate a and b to get gab mod p.
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Vve now give an overview of how to use the OTf protocol to create a OTf'. Instead of
H above, we use an encryption function E (e.g., DES). For simplicity, assume that 0 has
B 1 ... Elf; and 6. wants to learn E7 .
1. 0 generates 4 key pairs
(I(~,I(i),(I(~,I(i),(I(~,I(i),(I(~,I(l)
where each J(j is a randomly chosen key for E. For 1 ::; i ::; 16, with binary represen-
tation (iI, i2 , i3 , i4 ), 0 creates EE, = Ei EEl EKil (i) EEl E K i 2 (i) EB EKiJ (i) EEl EK;~ (i)I 2 3 I
2. Since 7 (the box number 6. wants to open) has binRly representation 0111, using four
OTl, 6. learns J(r, J(~, J(j, J(J.
3. 0 sends all EE; to 6..
It can easily be proven that if the encryption scheme and OTl are secure then the above
algorithm is secure. Since it only retrieves one key from each pair, 6. accurately decrypt at
most one message.
Those who are following closely will note a problems: the space and communication
cost is linear in the possible choices for comparison. "Ve really just need to compare two
numbers, the cryptography community has shown how to do this in time O(logn). This will
be discussed further in Appendix A.
The next section gives a formal treatment of the algorithm, along with proofs that it
achieves a one-dimensionally optimal result, that nothing is disclosed that is not obvious
from the result, and that cheating is either caught or detrimental to the cheater. In Section
2.4 we show that the algorithm can be used among multiple parties, and will converge on
a globally optimal solution. Section 3 analyzes the improvement that would result from
using this approach on a set of real shipping transactions. In Appendix A we give more
background on secure comparison, showing how to handle the efficiency issues with the
above simple approach.
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2. Secure Relative Outlier Detection (SROD) Algo-
rithms
This section gives the detail of the algorithms that have been discussed above. We start
off by introducing the notation used in the rest of the section, and also give some necessary
definitions. Subsection 2.3 describes the one dimensional secure relative outlier detection
(SROD) algorithm and also gives a proof of correctness, a proof of security and a proof of
honesty for the algorithm.
2.1 Notations
Sk = {st, s~, ,s~}, a set of m k-dimensional points
Ok = {at, o~, ,o~}, a set of n k-dimcnsional points
T, ~ {s'ls' E Sk}.. "
To' = {oiloi E Ok}
SF =A space filling curve
[a, b] " The range of SF
2.2 Formal Definition of Relative Outliers
Definition 1: (Relative outliers) T~k and TrJ< are relative outliers with respect to Sk and O~·
if:
• Cost of the optimal Hamiltonian cyclcs related to both Sk and Ok is minimized after
the memberships of all points in T5 k are swapped with those of all points in Td<
• T5 k and Tok are smallest such sets
Definition 2: (Extreme Points with respect to X and dx )
• X is a set of points, dx is a direction (i.e. left or right) related to X
• An extreme point is a point in X that is the furthest away from dx
• ith extreme point is a point in X that is the i/Ii furthest away from dx
Definition 3, (Extreme_POS(X, dx, 'i))
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• X is a set of points, d;r; is a direction (i.e. left or right) and i is an integer
• The function returns the posi tion of the i th extreme points with respect to X and dx
• If i > IXI, the function returns a position beyond the range limits (e.g., -00, +00) in
the direction dx .
Formally, Extreme_POS(X, d;r;, i) is:
Reorder X in ascending order according to position
if d;r; =right then
Return the position of ith item of X (+00 if i > IX!)
else
Return the position of the (IXI + 1 - i)th item of X (-00 if i > IXI)
end if
To illustrate, in Figure 7 ExtremeYOS(Sl, left, 2) returns 12, and Extreme_POS(S1, left,6)
returns -00.
", 0', ", 0; 0', s'.. 0; s ~ 0'o...... ........
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Figure 7: Illustration of extreme points
2.3 One-dimensional Secure Relative Outlier Detection (SROD)
Algorithm
'We gave a brief example of the way our protocol works in the introduction. The basic
idea of the protocol is that the parties perform a binary search for the maximum number of
beneficial points to swap. Given a number of points k, the parties compare their kth extreme
points. If the locations don't cross, k is a lower bound and the parties try 2k. Once the
locations cross, k is an upper bound, and the search continues between the upper and lower
bounds until the right number of points is found. The set of extreme points become the
relative outlier set at the end of the execution of the protocol.
The detailed protocol is given in Algorithm 1. Line 2 through line 6 determines initial
directions to start the protocol. Because both parties may request the same direction, if one
12
Algorithm 1 SROD: One Dimensional Secure Relative Outlier Detection
Require: 8 1 , ds , 0 1, do
1: {Line 2 through 6 determines initial direction}





7: lbound ~ 0
8: ubound ~ oa
9: i ~ 1
10: {Line 11 through 18 determines the maximal size of i}
11: while (ubound -lbound > 1) do
12: if Extreme_POS(St,l,i) > Extreme_POS(Ot,r,i) then
13: lbound ~ i
11: else





party h(1.'; more points than the other it gets its choice of direction (this ensures an optimal
result.) Lines 11 through 18 finds the maximal size of the relative outlier set.
The only communication occurs in lines 2 and 12, each of which is a comparison. vVe
have given a brief idea of how this is done, the details (from (Yao 1986)) are given in the
Appendix. To make lines 2-6 secure (only revealing the direction, so that if both get their
choice neither learns who has the larger set), we need a slightly more complex protocol. As
the secure comparison method builds on securely eva.luating a boolean circuit, it is straight-
forward to extend this to returning the direction rather than the comparison result. The
only requirement is a simple circuit that takes the desired of each and the comparison result
as input, and outputs the result direction. Merging and evaluating both circuits as one (as
described in the Appendix) allows these to be compared securely.
2.3.1 Illustration of BROD Execution
Let 0 and 1:::" be two parties, with original routes shown in Figure 8(a). Figures 8{b) and
8(c) present a space transformation process via a Hilbert curve. We now show the execution
















1 , , 1
(oj (dl
Figure 8: Execution of SROD protocol between two parties
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Initially, lbound l- 0, ubound l- 00 and i l- 1. Sincc the difference between lbound and
ubound is greater than 1, the execution enters the while loop. Extreme-.POS(O, left, 1)
returns 15, which is greater than the index returned from Extremc_POS(b., right, 1) (1),
so lbound l-1(i) and i l- 2. In the next iteration, Extreme-.POS(O,left,2) = 13 is still
greater Extreme-.POS(b., right, 2) = 3, so lbound l- 2 and i l- 4. Extreme_POS(O, left, 4) =
6 < Extreme-.POS(b., right, 4) = 9, so ubound l- 4 and i l- 3. Extreme_POS(O, left, 3) =
11> Ext1·eme_POS(b., right, 3) = 4, so lbound l- 3 and i l- 3. since ubound-lbound = 1,
the execution exits with 3 as the number of relative outliers, or points to be swapped
Figure 8(d) shows the resulting routes after each party gives lip their worst three points.
2.3.2 Proof of Correctness
A simple inductive proof demonstrates that the process terminates with the optimal (in one
dimension) results.
If ubound ~ lbound then the following hold
• lbound::; i ::; ubound
• since only way to change ubound and lbound is to set to i, ubound ~ lbound holds
(induction step)
If Extreme_POS(S,l, i) > Extreme_POS(O, r, i) then i is not greater than
• targeLresult,
• lbound gets set to i, othenvise lbound is not changed, so
• lbound::; targeLresult
• i > targeLresult
• ubound gets set to i, otherwise ubound not changed, so
• ubound > targeLresult
If ubound - lbound = 1 then
• ubound > targeLresult
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• lbaund::; target-result
• so lbound = targeLresult
If ubound ~ lbound = 1 then
• i set to lbound
Therefore, at the end, i = lbound = target-result.
One caveat: If both parties want the same end, it is possible (but not certain) that the
smaller party will cnd up with a longer tour than it started with. The global cost cannot
incrcase: the benefit accruing to the large party will be at least as great as the loss faced by
the smaller party. If this is a problem (i.e., parties will only participate if they are guaranteed
not to have a longer tour), steps 2-6 can be modified to abort the protocol if both parties
choose the same direction. If the protocol is aborted, the only information revealed is that
the two parties have their business concentrated on the same end of the line.
2.3.3 Proof of Security
Theorem 2.1. Algorithm 1 is secure under the definitions of Secure Multiparty Computa-
tion.
Proof Communication occurs from line 2 to line 6 and line 12. To prove the protocol is
secure, we only need to show these two parts of the protocol can be computcd securely.
This is done with a simulation approach. We can build a simulator such that given one
party's inputs, the number of relative outliers, and a direction, we are able to simulate what
that party sees during every step of its execution. Since directions are parts of the final
results, we can simulate the first part directly from the final results. A party may know
the other party has a larger dataset if the returned direction is different from the party's
requested direction. However, this additional information is not considered as an information
leak because it is inferred from the final results. Therefore, this first part of the protocol
is secure. Let S_5ROD(51, d", n) be simulator of line 12 of the SROD protocol where n
is the number of relative outliers and d.. is a direction. ·Without loss of generality, assume
ds = left(l). The simulator is given in Algorithm 2.
The basic idca of the simulator is the following: let n be the number of points to swap,
and t be a temporary size of the relative outlier set of 51. If t is less than n, 51 knows t
has yet to be maximal, and the protocol will double the size of t. On the other hand, if tis
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Algorithm 2 Simulator for SROD Protocol
Require: 51, dsl, n
l:il--l
2: Iboun.d l-- 0
3: ubound l-- 00
'I, while (i of n) do
5: if i < n then
6: [{nown: Extreme_P05(S',I,i,) > Extreme_POS(Ol,r,i)
7: Ibound l-- i
8: i{--i*2
9: else
10: [{nown: Extreme_POS(SI, I, i) < Extreme-POS(Ol, r, i)
11: ubound l-- i
12: i {-- llbn"nd~"bolmdJ
13: end if
14: end while
15: [(nown: ExtremeYOS(81,1,n) = Extreme_P08(01,r,n)
greater than n, S1 knows t is too big to be maximal, and the protocol will decrease the size
of t to a value that is in the middle of its upper and lower bounds. If t is the same as n, t
becomes the size of the relative outlier set of 8 1, and the protocol terminates its execution.
From the simulator, it is oblivious that the shared results from the protocol plus a party's
input are sufficient to precisely simulate each execution of the protocol. Therefore, because
the simulation process and execution of the protocol are computationally indistinguishable,
the SROD protocol is secure.
2.3.4 Proof of Honesty
o
To show that the protocol is incentive compatible, we define an objective function, and then
prove that by cheating:
• the cheating party gets caught
• the cheating party loses due to the decrease in its objective function
• cheating results in no change in the true solution (solution without cheating)
The objective function for a party is defined as the tour length for its points. Formally, the
cost for a party P, Cost(P) is
{Let S represent the list of points owned by P}
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Reorder S in ascending order according to position
Cost = Position(Slsl) - Position(SI)
The following discussion assumes that P is the cheating party, and Q is the honest party.
'Ne use the following definitions:
• Sp (resp. Sq) represents pIS (resp. QI s) original set of points.
• Swappl (resp. Swapqd represents the set of points of P (resp. Q) that are swapped in
a true run of the protocol (i.e., if P was honest).
• Swappe (resp. Swapqc) represents the set of points of P (resp. Q) that are swapped
after a "cheating" run of the protocol.
• Cost(P)truc represents piS final cost after correctly executing the protocol.
• Cost(P)dICfJf represents piS final cost after "cheating" in the protocol.
• Pos(X) represents thc position of a point X.
• nswaptrue = ISwappt! represents the number of points to swap in a correct execution
of the protocol.
• nswapdleat = ISwappcl is the number of points to swap achieved by "cheating" in the
protocol in some way.
• ISpl = n is the total number of points originally owned by P.
There are two ways that a party can cheat.
1. Falsifying the input to the protocol:
(a) 'Withholding points from the protocol entirely,
(b) 'Withholding points from execution, but adding them to swap, or
(c) Adding fake points
2. l'v1odifying or causing aberrations in the execution of the protocol:
(a) Aborting the protocol,
(b) Lying / LvIodifying step 12 of protocol 1, or
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While it would appear there are other ways of cheating (e.g., lying in steps 2-6), any such
cheating is equivalent to one of the above. For example, any cheating in the secure protocol
computing steps 2-6 will give an execution of those steps equivalent to some falsified input.
With one exception (cheating at Step 2, discussed later), each form of cheating leads
either to a suboptimal result from the cheater's point of view, or the honest party is able to
detect that cheating has occurred. We will prove this on a case-by~case basis. 'Without loss
of generality, we assume that P holds the left direction while Q holds the right direction.
Case la: Here a party withholds points from the protocol entirely. Assume that P with-
holds a point X from the protocol. Either X f/; Swappt or X E Swappt.
x ¢. Swapp! =} Swappt = Swappc =} Swapqt = Swapqc
=} Protocol is unaffected
X E Swapp' => either (3Y E S,IY E Swap" 1\ Y rt Swap"l\pos(Y) < pos(X))
or (3Y E SplY E Swapp< 1\ Y rt Swapp' 1\ pos(Y) < pos(X))
=} Cost(P)chefJt > Cost(P)true
In this case, either the points would not have been swapped anyway, and thus do not
affect the protocol, or they would have been swapped. In the latter case, again there are
two possibilities. The first is that there were closer points that P could have gained, so the
cheating party ends np with a longer travel distance than if it had behaved correctly. The
other is that P could have given up some of these points instead of some of the points it
will now have to swap. But even in this case, the points withheld have to be farther for P
than the points swapped, thus it still ends up with a longer travel distance. Both of these
could in fact be considered legitimate - one party may choose to withhold some loads from
the ones that may be swapped.
Case Ib: Falsifying input can also occur through withholding points during the execution
of the protocol, then adding them to the swap (instead of legitimate points). Assume that P
withholds a point X from the execution of the protocol but adds it to the swap instead of some
point Z. i.e. X 1: Spf\X substituted for some point Z E Swappc. Again, either nswaplrue =
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nswapchcat + 1 or nswaptrue = nswapcheat (Note: nswaplrue cannot be nswapc/zeat - 1).
nswaplruc = nswapclleat + 1 => X E Swappt => 3Y E SwapqdY ¢. SwapqcA
(pos(Y) < pos(X) V pos(Y) < pos(Z))
=> Cost(P)chcat > Cost(P)trlJc
nswaptrue = nswapcheat => either X E Swappt => (3W E Sp!lV E Swappc A W ¢. Swappl)
ifZ=W
=> Protocol is unaffected
if Z # W => pos(Z) < pos(W)
=> Cost(P)chcat > Cost(P)truc
or X ¢. Swappt => Swappt = Swapl'c => Z E SwaPl't
=> pos(Z) < Pos(X)
=> Cost(P)chcat > Cost(P)tTUC
The +1 case, where the withheld point would have been swapped, P is keeping a point
that it could have traded for a better point from Q, giving P a higher cost. If the withheld
points would not have been swapped, there are two possibilities:
• 'Withheld points are further away (costlier) than the points swapped by Q. In this
case, Q detects the cheating at the time of the swap.
• 'Withheld points are not further, but are not as close as alternative points In this case,
though cheating is not detected, P party ends up swapping some points which are
closer for it than some of the points it would have swapped had it not cheated, so P
loses from cheating.
Case Ie: Alternatively, P can add "fake" points to the execution or the protocol, and then
swap real points instead (swapping fake points would clearly be caught, when the honest
party goes to pick up the non-existent load.) In either of these cases, the honest party will
get points that are further than some it gave up, or the cheating will be detected.
Formally, assume that P adds a point X to the protocol, where X ¢. Sp' Either X ¢.
Swappc or X E Swappc .
X ¢. Swappc => Swappc = Swappt => Swapqc = Swapq!
=> Protocol is unaffected
X E Swappc => either nswapchcat = nSWaplTlJC + 1
=> Chea ting is detected
or nswapchcal = nswaplruc
=> either (3Y E SplY E Swapp/A Y substituted for X in Swappc)
=> Protocol is unaffected
or (3Y E SplY ¢. Swappt A Y substituted for X in Swappc )
=> Cheating is detected
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Case 2a: If the protocol is aborted by either party, the other party immediately knows
this and can demand an explanation. If the explanation is unsatisfactory, clearly the party
is cheating.
Case 2b: The effect of lying at step 12 causes the two parties to exchange a suboptimal
number of points. (i.e. nswapcheat -=J. nswaptrue) If this number is more than the optimal
number, this will be found out at the exchange phase and P will be caught. If the number is
less than the optimal number, the only result is that both parties have a longer than optimal
tour. This increases the cost for both parties (thoug,h possibly to an unequal extent), but
since P will have a higher than optimal cost, and cannot know for certain if Q or itself will
be hurt the most, there is no incentive for P to cheat.
nswapclu:at > nswaptrue ~ (3Y E SwappclY rt SwapptA
(3Z E Swap"IZ i Swapq' /\ pos(Z) > pos(y)))
=} Cheating is detected
nswapcheat < nswaptruc =} (3Y E SwapptlY fj. Swappc/\
(3Z E Swap"IZ i Swap" /\ pos(Z) < pos(y)))
::::} Cost(P)dLCat > Cost(P)true
Combination of the above A cheating party can indulge in any combination of the
above to confound the other parties. However, the cost effect of each individual cheating
is additive; there is no interdependence on the penalties associated with cheating. Thus a
combination of any of the above simply implies a combination of the individual penalties
and therefore, the cheating party will either be caught, have a higher cost than by being
honest, or the protocol wilt be unaffected.
Choice of direction: A party can successfully lie in steps 2-6 without detection. The
effect is to enable P to force Q to conform to its choice for direction. This is equivalent to
falsified input: a large number of fake points at the end of the scale in P's chosen direction.
Q cannot distinguish this from the true case where P has these points; if the points were
real they would never be swapped anyway. If Q party gets its choice of direction, or P really
has more points, then the protocol is unaffected. However, if the protocol is affected, one
party will end up with a higher cost than in an honest execution, the other with a lower
cost. 'While P cannot know which party will gain, it can make a reasonable guess based OIl
the distribution of its own points: If its points are already close together, then it is more
likely to lose if it is forced to swap all of these and take the other direction. As has been
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pointed out, this is a problem even if both parties are honest; allowing abort after step 6 is
one solution.
2.4 Execution of SROD among Multiple Parties
Define the optimal result from the execution of SROD among multiple parties to be the
perfect partitioning among all parties' one-dimensional datasets. In other words, any two
of parties' ranges of their one-dimensional datasets arc disjoint. This results in the minimal
global tour (in one dimension).
Theorem 2.2. Execution of SROD among k-parties eventually reaches optimal: k partitions
(where k ~ 2.
PTOof This is proven through strong induction on the number of parties.
Base case: k = 2. From the previous examples, the base case is obviously true.
Inductive step: Let integer t > 2, and assume the claim is true for all k < t. We need to
prove that the claim is true when k = t.
Let k = t - 1. From the induction hypothesis, the execution among the k parties creates
k partitions. Then let another party (say I) join the k-parties and i be any party among the
k-parties or k partitions. If we leave i alone and execute the protocol among the re;t of the
k parties plus t. Then we have a new set of k partitions.
Considering i with the other parties, if the protocol is executed between i and anyone
of the parties whose dataset range not overlapping that of i, the protocol does nothing. Let
p be the number of parties whose dataset ranges overlapping that of i.
If p < k, the execution of the protocol among these p parties plus i eventually leads to
a set of disjoint partitions. These partitions plus the previously disjoint partitions with i
consist k + 1 disjoint partitions.
If p = k, first we need to point out the fact that either the right or left most partition
eventually belongs to the largest party (the one with the most points). During the execution
among the k + 1 parties, if the largest party is selected with any party that overlap with
it, the partition of the largest party will shrink. Since there are finite number of points for
each party, the number of times the partition can shrink is finite. Therefore, eventually, no
party's partition overlaps with that of the largest party. Then the execution among the rest
of the parties will lead to k partitions. Adding the partition of the largest party, we have
k + 1 disjoint partitions. As a result, the claim is true when k = t.
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Because the baEie ca.<;e and inductive step are true, the claim is true for all k ~ 2. D
3. Experimental Analysis
1Point-swapping is a correct model if multiple trucks return to u central warehouse, such us the model
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Figure 10: Savings in Individual Distance
guarantees positive savings, the average savings in total distance are 0.6% for PS, 5.7% for
AS and 17.8% for DS.
Figure 10 give the savings by party - again it is clear that destination swapping, by
optimizing the longest tour, gives the best results. It also shows that it is possible for a
party to get a longer tour, even when the global tour length decreases.
3.1 Empirical Results of N party collaboration
We now consider the observed empirical effect of running the algorithm described in the
previous section but for a dataset where we have (a) Individual points in 2 dimensions, (b)
pickup and drop off pairs associated with each shipment. The goal of this run is to identify
how much of the possible improvements can be generated by the algorithm defined and how
that is affected by the number N of transport companies involved.
vVe also used the first week's data from the dataset described earlier, but ignored the
pick-up and delivery pail' for each data set. At first, we randomly allocated the same number
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of points to each company, named 1,2, ... , n. These points are converted to one-dimensional
data using SF. For every pair of company 'i and j where i -=j:. j, we applied the algorithm
and repeated until equilibrium was reached. After repeating this for 20 initial random
allocations, the average savings in total distance and individual distance are shown in Table
1 for several number of participants. The results are summarized in Figure 11. Note that
Table 1: Saving~ for multiple parties
n Distance Before Distance After Individual Savings Total Savings
Swapping Swapping (%) (%)
2
1 412.4 1 311.8 1 24.4%
27.7%
2 399.3 2 275.8 2 30.9%
1 332.6 1 255.4 1 23.2%
3 2 331 2 130.9 2 60.5% 39.9%
3 333.1 3 213.9 3 35.8%
1 283.3 1 214 1 24.5%
2 288.2 2 117.9 2 59.1%
45.2%4
3 298.6 3 117.4 3 60.7%
4 292 4 189.1 4 35.2%
1 264.7 1 192 1 27.5%
2 263.1 2 113.4 2 56.9%
5 3 264.6 3 72.2 3 72.7% 48.5%
4 263.8 4 149.2 4 43.4%
5 263.8 5 155.9 5 40.9%
1 244.5 1 182 1 25.5%
2 243.3 2 107.5 2 55.8%
6
3 256.6 3 62.3 3 75.7%
51.4%
4 240.8 4 71.4 4 70.4%
5 244.5 5 145.7 5 40.4%
6 239.8 6 147.7 6 38.4%
10 (Sum) 1986.6 (Sum) 792.3 60.1%
15 (Sum) 2534.6 (Sum) 847.1 66.6%
20 (Sum) 3097.4 (Sum) 856.2 72.4%
as the number of parties increase, the savings increase. This is to be expected, as the size of
each partition shrinks a~ the number of parties grows, whereas the expected tour length of
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Figure 11: Savings for different number of parties
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4. Is the approach pro-competitive?
'While we have shown that the method will generally result in an overall cost savings for the
hauler, can we expect that some of these cost savings will accrue to the shipper?
What does it mean to say that this collaboration is pro-competitive?
• Decentralized operation of the algorithm generates the same solution for the shipper
as centralized operation.
• As N increases, the efficiency increases overall i.e., a viral effect.
• Individual transport companies cannot guess which set of points they would get hence
reducing the potential for collusionary pricing.
Consider a set of N independent companies each with m points. Assume that the m
points for each company are uniformly distributed along the line. As described in Section
2.4, repeated runs of the protocol will result in continuous improvement in tour length, with
each company retaining m points. Eventually equilibrium is reached, with a unique partition
of the line into N segments. Thus the decentralized operation of the algorithm generates the
same solution as the efficient algorithm offrred by a central decision maker.
Note also that as N increases, there is a greater ability to cluster sets of points close
together. Thus every possible transport company has the potential to both decrease its own
costs as well as decrease costs for all other companies. In that respect, the algorithm presents
an open system for potential collaboration and decreases the incentives for collusion.
Now consider how an individual transport company would bid for a supplier's work
knowing the existence of the opportunity for collaboration. Given the results described
above, an individual transport company cannot guess which segment or which set of points
it will end up with. In the absence of this certainty, an individual company is faced 'with
some probability of cost reduction through swaps and some probabilistic description of offered
load after swaps. This decreases the ability for individual transport companies to collude to
influence shipper prices. We do not explore the price consequences in this paper - we leave
such exploration to future research.
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5. Conclusion I Future Work
vVe have described an algorithm that enables independent companies to identify opportu-
nities for collaboration without sharing unnecessary data. The theoretical analysis shows
that the algorithm ensures that no information can be inferred except that from the shared
data, that truthtclling is incentive compatible and that features of the algorithm make it
procompctitive. In addition, application of the algorithm to an empirical dataset indicate a
substantial potential impact.
The specific problem described in this paper is a first step towards a greater integration
of data encryption techniques and theory along with problems in operations management.
An interesting open research question concerns the potential tradeoff between the use of a
heuristic approach to problem solution that admits a tight security property vs a closer to
optimal algorithm that permits data leakage. We leave such exploration to future research.
A. Secure Multi-party Computation
Substantial work has been done on secure multi-party computation. The key result is that a
wide class of computations can be done securely under reasonable assumptions. Any function
that can be represented by a polynomial circuit in terms of the number of input bits can
be evaluated in reasonable time. We give a brief overview of this work, concentrating on
material that is used in the paper. The definitions given here are from Goldreich (1998). For
simplicity, we concentrate on the two party case. Extending the definitions to the multi-party
case is straightforward.
A.I Security in the Semi-Honest Model
A semi-honest party follows the rules of the protocol using its correct input, but is free
to later use what it sees during execution of the protocol to compromise security. This is
somewhat realistic in the real world because parties who want to find out results for their
mutual benefit will follow the protocol to get correct results. Also a protocol that is buried
in large, complex software can not be easily altered.
A formal definition of private two party computation in the semi-honest model is given
below. Computing a function privately is equivalent to computing it securely. The formal
proof of this can be found in Goldreich (1998).
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Definition A.I. (privacy \V.r.t. semi-honest behavior):(Goldrcich 1998)
Let f' {D, I}" x {D, I}"~ {D, I}" x {D, I}" be probabilistic, polynomial-time function-
ality, where j, (x, y)(rcsp., j, (x, y)) denotes the first (resp., second) element of f (x, y)) and
let 11 be two-party protocol for computing f.
Let the view of the first (resp. second) party during an execution of 11 on (x, y), denoted
viewp (x, y) (resp., view¥ (x, V)) is (x, TI, ml,···, Tnt) (resp., (y, T2, ml,···, mt)) where TI
reprcscnt thc outcome of the first (resp., T2 second) party's internal coin tosses, and Tni
represent thc ith message it has received.
The output of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of 11 on (x, y) is denoted
outputP (x, y) (resp., output¥ (x, v)) and is implicit in the party's view of the execution.
11 privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, denoted
5 I, 52 such that
{(So (xJ. (x, y)), j, (x, y))L "e{O .)" =c {(view~ (x, y), output~ (x, y))} "(1)
'" , x,yE{O,I}
((J,(X,y),S2(X,j,(X,y)))) e{o.)" _c {(output~(x,y),vicw~(x,y))} "(2)
x,y , x,yE{O,I}
where =c denotes computational indistinguishability.
The above definition says that a computation is seclll'e if the view of each party during
the execution of the protocol can be effectively simulated by the input and the output of
the party. This is not quite thc same as saying that private information is protected. For
example, assume two parties usc a secure protocol to compare two positive integers. If A has
2 as its intcgcr and the comparison result indicates that 2 is bigger than equal other site's
integer, A can conclude that B has 1 as its input. Site A can deduce this information by
solely looking at its local input and the final result - the disclosure is a fault of the problem
being solved and not the protocol used to solve it. To prove a protocol is secure, we have to
show that anything seen is not giving more information then seeing the final result.
In summary, secure multi-party protocol will not reveal more information to a particular
party than the information that can be induced by looking at that party's input and the
output.
A.2 Yao's general two party secure function evaluation
Yao's general secure two party evaluation is based on expressing the function f(x, y) as a
circuit and encrypting the gates for securc evaluation(Yao 1986). 'With this protocol any
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two party function can be evaluated securely in the semi~honcst model, but to be efficiently
evaluated the function must have a small circuit representation. To show how secure circuit
evaluation is done without going into too much detail, we will present a simple approach
here. In real life application where performance is an important issue, other approaches
must be used. For comparing any two integers securely, Yao's generic method is one of
the most efficient methods known, although other asymptotically equivalent but practically
more efficient algorithms could be used as well(Ioannidis & Grama 2003).
The circuit evaluation techniques depends on lout of 4 oblivious transfer. Oblivious
transfer was described in Section A.2.4. Details of all these techniques can be found in
Goldreich (1998).
A.2.1 Evaluating the Logical Gates Securely
It is known fact that every circuit can be built by only using XOR( E9) and AND(· )gates. If
we have a mechanism to evaluate these gates securely and combine the results securely, we
will be able to compute any circuit securely.
It must be clear that if we do not want to reveal more than the final result, we must
not be revealing anything during the intermediate evaluations. Let assume that after the
evaluation of each logic gate, the result of the logic gate divided into two random shares ,
such that T = Tl EEl T2 where T is the result. If Alice has the 7'1 and Bob has the T2, both of
them will not be able to predict the result(other part can have anything as the share). The
problem is that the output of this particular gate is an input to an another gate, therefore
in the evaluation of the next gate, we have to combine TI and T2 privately and again output
the random shares of the result. Clearly this process can be repeated to evaluate the entire
circuit. Now we will describe how to achieve this for each type of gate.
A.2.2 Evaluating an XOR gate securely
Given the random shares of each input wire, we would like to create random shares of the
result. Assume that Alice's part of each random share is (aI, a2) and Bob has (b I , b2). ·We
would like to create ar,br such that (a1 EEl bd E9 (a2 EEl b:!) = (ar E9 br). For XOR gate it is
easy to achieve this goal, just set ar = (a1 ED a2) and br = (b1EEl b2). This procedure is secure
because each party can evaluate its share without exchanging any information with the other
party, therefore other party cannot learn anything. Note that XOR of an hr , will give the
result of the gate. Since the initial shares are random, final shares are also random.
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Table 2: AND gate evaluation
I (0, 1) (0, 1) (1,0) (1, 1)
I (a1" a2) (J)r (a\ "a2) (J) ," (at' a2) EIl T at . a2) EIl T
A.2.3 Evaluating an AND gate securely
Solution for the XOR gate was trivial because we were able use the commutative property of
the XOR function. For evaluating the AND gate, we will have to use the oblivious transfer
tool. Again Alice's part of each random share is (at, a2) and Bob has (bl , ~). Now Alice
and Bob want to evaluate (at EB bd· (a2 EIl b2) = (ur@br ). Since Alice knows its inputs, it
can evaluate the result of the gate for each of the 4 possibilities. For example, if Bob has
(0,0) as its input, the result of the gate will be at . a2. Table A.2.3 shows the creation of
such table, one important thing to note is to T. This r will be the random share of the Alice
(ar ). In other words, Alice creates its own random share. Now using the lout of 4 oblivious
transfer, Bob can learn its random share. Assume that Bob haC) (I,O),then Bob will get only
the third element which is (at· a2) @T. Clearly ar @br = al . a2, the required result.
A.2.4 Combining Everything
"Vith the help of previous constructs, given the random shares of each input wire, we can
construct the random shares of the output of each gate. At the start of the evaluation, each
party can xor its inputs with some random number and send the random number to other
site to create the initial random shares. After this step above procedures for evaluating gates
can be used until we get the final result.
Note that constant depth and logarithmic size circuits are known for comparison. Since
each gate is evaluated in constant time, this shows that it is possible to avoid the efficiency
issues posed by direct oblivious transfer described in Section.
A.3 Extension to Malicious Model
In the semi-honest model, we require that each party follow the protocol exactly. This
assumption makes it is easy to develop algorithms for semi-honest model. Although the
semi-honest modcl can be a reaC)onable in many cases, clearly a solution for parties that do
not follow the protocols (i.e., showing malicious behavior) is desirable.
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It can be shown that any semi-honest algorithm can be modified to work in malicious
model. This can be achieved by using zero knowledge proofs and commitment schemes. The
key is making the oblivious transfer protocol proof against a malicious party (as shown in
Section 1.2); the rest follows ea,c;ily.
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